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State Taxation of Foreign Commerce
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles
99 S. Ct. 1813 (1979)
Six Japanese shipping firms (hereinafter appellants) paid, under
protest, an ad valorem property tax levied by the City and County
of Los Angeles upon shipping containers' hired for exclusive use in
foreign commerce. Appellants were incorporated under the laws of
Japan, had their commercial domiciles and principal places of business
in Japan, and paid taxes levied by the government of Japan on the
full value of the containers. Suit was brought in the Superior Court of
Los Angeles seeking a refund of the taxes collected. The trial court
awarded judgment for the plaintiffs-appellants upon the basis of the
"home port" doctrine ' and on the additional ground that the California
1. The term "shipping containers" has been defined as follows:
A container is a permanent reusable article of transport equipment
... durably made of metal, and equipped with doors for easy access
to the goods and for repeated use. It is designed to facilitate the
handling, loading, stowage aboard ship, carriage, discharge from ship,
movement, and transfer of large numbers of packages simultaneously
by mechanical means to minimize the cost and risks of manually
processing each package.
Simon, The Law of Shipping Containers, 5 J. MAUTIME L. & COMM. 507, 513
(1974), quoted in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 99 S. Ct. 1813,
1815 n.1 (1979) (hereinafter Japan Line).
2. The Superior Court's opinion is not officially reported.
3. The "home port" doctrine was first introduced in Hays v. Pacific Mail
Steamship Co., 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596 (1855) (hereinafter Hays), which held
that only the state wherein a vessel had its home port could validly tax that
vessel. The term home port was defined as "the domicile of a vessel . . . at
which she is registered" and which, by New York law, had to be "nearest to
the place where the owner or owners reside." Id. at 598. Although the wording
used in Hays appears clearly to equate home port with port of registry, later
cases have interpreted the term differently. If a vessel has not acquired a tax
situs in another state, "the domicile of the owner is the situs of a vessel for the
purpose of taxation, wholly irrespective of the place of enrollment .... ." Ayer
& Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U.S. 409, 421 (1906). "The solution of the
question where her home port is, when it arises, depends wholly upon the
locality of her owner's residence and not upon the place of her enrollment."
Id. at 422. See generally Page, Jurisdiction to Tax Tangible Movables, 1945
Wis. L. REv. 125.
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tax contravened the U.S. Constitution's Commerce Clause.4 The Court
of Appeals reversed, concluding that the home port doctrine was ana-
chronistic and that an apportioned, nondiscriminatory State property
tax was constitutionally valid.' The California Supreme Court affirmed
the Court of Appeals decision.6 Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257(2),' the United States Supreme Court, held reversed: when a
state seeks to tax the instrumentalities of foreign commerce, a more
elaborate inquiry is required than that which is necessary when inter-
state commerce is involved. In addition to inquiries of tax situs, appor-
tionment, and nondiscrimination,8 when international commerce is in-
volved, one must further consider whether a tax creates a substantial
risk of international multiple taxation or prevents the federal govern-
ment from "speaking with one voice when regulating commercial rela-
tions with foreign governments." Because California's ad valorem
property tax failed these additional tests, it was found unconstitutional
under the Commerce Clause.'
The Court did not rely on the home port doctrine in striking
down California's ad valorem property tax. Although finding it un-
necessary to examine this doctrine, the Court strongly implied that
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3: "Congress shall have power to...
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes."
5. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 132 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1976),
aff'd, 20 Cal. 3d 180' (1977).
6. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 20 Cal. 3d 180, 141 Cal.
Rptr. 905, 571 P.2d 254 (1977).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 provides:
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State
in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court as follows:
(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of
any state on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution,
treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of
its validity.
The requirements are clearly met here because California's tax statutes were
challenged as being unconstitutional and the California Supreme Court upheld
them. Therefore, the Court's jurisdiction is assumed.
8. These Commerce Clause inquiries have been formulated as follows:
if a state tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing
state, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate (foreign)
commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the state, it will
not be deemed to be an impermissible burden on interstate (foreign) commerce.
See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
9. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 99 S. Ct. at 1823, 1824
(1979).
NOTE
the rehabilitation of the rule as a tool of Commerce Clause analysis
was unlikely. The Court assumed that Commerce Clause considera-
tions would be satisfied if interstate commerce were involved, there-
fore making the tax constitutionally valid. However, when foreign
commerce is involved, the constitutional inquiries which must be made
are more extensive than those necessary when only domestic com-
merce is being considered. The Court further reasoned that the
apportionment rule of taxation, which has permitted interstate com-
merce to be taxed by several jurisdictions, was inapplicable. The
foundation for the Court's prior acceptance of this rule was its ability
to ensure that all potential taxing jurisdictions would apportion their
taxes. In an international context, however, this ability is absent.
Since an apportioned state tax might still result in double taxation,
the Commerce Clause would be violated. The Court also reasoned
that because international trade is a matter of special national con-
cern, national uniformity in the area must be unimpaired by state
action. Any other conclusion would prevent the nation from "speak-
ing with one voice" in the regulation of foreign commerce. For these
reasons, prior case law analysis in the area of taxation of interstate
commerce is inadequate when applied to foreign commerce.
The tension existing between the Commerce Clause and a state's
right to regulate certain aspects of commerce has resulted in extensive
litigation. Although taxation is not regulation per se, it is incidental
regulation, and a state may not regulate interstate commerce.' The
United States Supreme Court initially drew a distinction between
subjects of a "local" nature, and those requiring "national uniform-
ity." 11 In later cases, the Court established more refined guidelines
to determine whether constitutional limitations were being violated
by state taxation. The lines drawn have often been fine ones because
commerce is, in and of itself, both a national and a local concern.
Although the manner and extent to which states may tax interstate
commerce has been relatively well-defined, the extent to which these
10. If a tax meets certain criteria (see note 8 supra), then it will not be
deemed to be a regulation of interstate commerce. However, the burden which
is imposed by a tax may have the effect of regulating commerce since it may
tend to restrict the flow of goods among the various states. A state's right to
tax property within its boundaries may only be exercised within constitutional
bounds. When these limits are exceeded, the regulatory aspects of the tax
are deemed to be dominant and no longer merely incidental, thus rendering the
tax unconstitutional. See Case of the State Freight Tax, (15 Wall.) 232 (1872),
wherein a state tax was held to be a regulation of interstate commerce.
11. Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
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principles apply to foreign commerce had never before been presented
to the Supreme Court.12 In this respect, Japan Line is a case of first
impression and establishes the criteria by which state taxation of for-
eign commerce is to be constitutionally judged. It establishes two
further Commerce Clause tests, in addition to those applicable to inter-
state commerce, which must be met in order for a state tax upon foreign
commerce to be upheld.
This case may be best understood within an historical perspective,
which approach this Note will follow.
I. HISTORiCAL BACKGROUND
A. The Home Port Doctrine
The home port doctrine was first enunciated in Hays v. Pacific
Mail S.S. Co.,"3 where the United States Supreme Court struck down
a California ad valorem property tax which had been levied upon a
New York company's twelve steamships. The steamships were en-
gaged in interstate commerce between New York and California via
Panama. The vessels were regularly, but only temporarily, within
California's jurisdiction. The company was incorporated under the
laws of New York, where all stockholders resided, and where the
vessels were registered and taxed. The vessels remained in California
only long enough to unload their cargo and undergo repairs for the
next voyage. The Court held the tax invalid because the ships were
found not to have acquired a tax situs in California. The only state
which could levy a tax upon the vessels was New York, where the
ships were registered and, therefore, had their home port. Underlying
the Court's opinion was the belief that the vessels did not have suffi-
cient contacts with the state of California to outweigh the interests
of the state of New York and the nation as a whole:
They [the vessels] are thus engaged in the business and com-
merce of the country, upon the highway of nations, touching at
such ports and places as these great interests demand .... And so
far as respects the ports and harbors within the United States,
they are entered and cargoes discharged or laden on board,
12. The confusion which has plagued this area is evident among the Cali-
fornia decisions leading up to Japan Line, See Scandinavian Airlines Sys. v.
County of Los Angeles, 56 Cal. 2d 11, 14 Cal. Rptr. 25, 363 P.2d 25, cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 899 (1961); contra Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. County of Ala,
meda, 12 Cal. 3d 772, 117 Cal. Rptr. 448, 528 P.2d 56 (1974).
13. Hays, 58 U.S. at 596.
NOTE
independently of any control over them, except as it respects such
municipal and sanitary regulations of the local authorities as are
not inconsistent with the constitution and laws of the general
government, to which belongs the regulation of commerce with
foreign nations and between the states.
14
Emphasizing the lack of a sufficient jurisdictional nexus between
the vessels and the state of California, the Court noted that admiralty
law draws a distinction between vessels lying at their home port and
vessels lying at some other port.15 The vessels were said to often be
subjected to a "different set of principles" when lying at a "foreign"
port; 16 admiralty law governed at a foreign port, whereas state law
governed at the home port.17
This emphasis upon the lack of a taxable situs in California indi-
cates the Court's concern with due process considerations."' The Court,
however, also addressed commerce clause considerations, and found
that the regulation of foreign and interstate commerce belongs to the
federal government."' Thus, once an instrumentality of commerce
left its home port for international waters, it fell within this category
and became subject solely to federal jurisdiction.
B. The Apportionment Rule
Early Applications to Land-Based Instrumentalities of Commerce
With the advent of the "apportionment rule" I0 of taxation, the
possibility arose of numerous states taxing the same instrumentalities
14. Id. at 597-98.
15. It has been suggested that the Hays Court mentioned this fact in order to
show that the vessel had become "so peculiarly imbued with international char-
acteristics" that the exercise of state sovereignty by any state other than that
of domicile would be unwise. Scandinavian Airlines Sys. v. County of Los
Angeles, 56 Cal. 2d 11, 14 Cal. Rptr. 25, 33, 363 P.2d 25, 33, cert. denied, 368
U.S. 899 (1961).
16. Hays, 58 U.S. at 598-99.
17. Peyroux v. Howard and Varion, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 324, 341 (1833).
18. Due process requires that the taxing state have a substantial nexus with
the property sought to be taxed. The test depends on whether the tax has, in
practical operation, a relation to the opportunities, benefits, or protection afforded
by the taxing state. Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169
(1949).
19. "Whatever subjects of this power (to regulate commerce) are in their
nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may
justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Con-
gress." Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 319.
20. The "apportionment rule" requires that any methods which a state uses
to determine its tax upon a given property must bear a reasonable relationship to
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of commerce. The theory under which a taxable situs was created
shifted from the ancient maxim mobilia sequuntur personam 2 to that
of lex situs. 2 Personal property was held taxable within the state in
which it was physically present (although the owner was neither
domiciled in nor a citizen of that state), as well as within the domi-
ciliary state. Thus, in Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania,23 the rolling stock of a railroad was found to have at
least two tax situses. The legal fiction that movable property had only
one tax situs in the domiciliary state was abandoned when justice
required that the actual situs be examined. The apportionment rule
required that the maxim cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex be
applied.24 Thus, the railroad cars were found to "continuously and
permanently" 2 travel upon fixed routes in Pennsylvania. The Su-
preme Court reasoned that if the cars never physically left Pennsyl-
vania, they would have been taxable; the mere fact that they crossed
the state's boundaries could not therefore affect the state's power to
levy a tax upon property once found within its jurisdiction. The fact
that the cars were involved in interstate commerce could not free them
from state taxation because "[lit is equally well settled that there is
nothing in the Constitution or laws of the United States which
the time that the property is physically present within the state, in order that the
sum total of all apportioned taxes do not exceed one full ad valorem assessment.
See Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952). The apportionment rule
seems to be a refinement of due process requirements in that the tax must be
proportionately related to the property being taxed; this relationship is defined in
terms of the time spent within the taxing state.
21. Mobilia sequuntur personam means "movables follow the (law of the)
person." STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378, cited in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1154 (4th ed. 1968). This doctrine originated in the Middle Ages when mov-
able property consisted chiefly of gold and jewels which could easily be carried
from place to place, or hidden, by the owner.
22. Lex situs means "the law of the place where property is situated. The
general rule is that lands and other immovables are governed by the lex situs; i.e.,
by the law of the country where they are situated." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1058 (4th ed. 1968). As more and more personal property became disconnected
from its owner, i.e., it could no longer be easily carried on one's person from
place to place, this rule became dominant. See Pullman's Palace-Car Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, 22 (1891) (hereinafter Pullman).
23. 141 U.S. 18 (1891).
24. "The reason of the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 288 (4th ed. 1968). The ability to proportion state taxes elimi-
nated the possibility that property would be taxed beyond its full value if more
than one state could validly levy a tax.
25. When the Court established this standard of continuity and permanency,
it was deciding the due process question of whether the railroad cars had a suffi-
ciently close nexus with the State of Pennsylvania in order to validly permit the
tax to be imposed. Id. at 26-27.
NOTE
prevents a state from taxing personal property employed in interstate
or foreign commerce like other personal property within its jurisdic-
tion." 2"
The ability of states to levy taxes upon interstate commerce was
predicated upon the Court's finding that the apportionment rule was
a just and equitable method of assessment "because, [i]f it were
adopted by all the states through which these cars ran, the company
would be assessed upon the whole value of its capital stock, and no
more." 27 Although particular cars left the state, the assessment was
valid because substantially the same number of cars were within the
state at all times.28 This new-found ability to apportion taxes re-
moved a major obstacle to nondomiciliary state taxation of foreign and
interstate commerce." The Court found that the home port rule still
applied to vessels because they only "incidentally and temporarily"
enter a state's port and, therefore, cannot be said, in any real sense, to
enter its jurisdiction; their legal situs remains their only tax situs.
26. For a general discussion of a state's ability to tax interstate commerce,
see generally Developments in the Law: Federal Limitations on State Taxation
of Interstate Business, 75 HARV. L. REv. 953 (1962).
27. Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 141 U.S.
at 26.
28. In other words, the average number of cars which could be found within
Pennsylvania on any given day did not vary. For example, in one six-month
period there may have been 200 railroad cars within the state. For the other
six months, there may have been only 100 railroad cars present, but the average
number of railroad cars which would continuously and permanently be within
the state would be 150 cars. The state could validly tax this average number of
cars.
It should be noted that the basis of assessment is not connected with the
average number of cars found to continuously be within the state. Therefore, it
appears that the Court was concerned with this average number only in regard
to due process considerations.
29. The Pullman Court was careful to distinguish between land-based in-
strumentalities and those that traveled upon the high seas:
Commerce on land between the different states is so strikingly dissimi-
lar, in many respects, from commerce on water, that it is often difficult
to regard them in the same aspect in reference to the respective con-
stitutional powers and duties of the state and federal governments. No
doubt commerce by water was principally in the minds of those who
framed and adopted the constitution, although both its language and
spirit embrace commerce by land as well .... [V]ehicles of commerce
by water being instruments of intercommunication with other nations,
the regulation of them is assumed by the national legislature. So that
state interference with transportation by water, and especially by sea, is
at once clearly marked and distinctly discernible. But it is different
with transportation by land.
Pullman's Palace Car Co., citing Railroad Co. v. Maryland, 21 Wall 456, 470.
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This major distinction between the two types of commerce, land and
sea, was destined to have a lasting effect on future Court decisions.
In Northwest Airlines Inc. v. Minnesota,"0 the Supreme Court was
presented with a situation analogous to that presented by vessels.
Northwest Airlines was incorporated under the laws of Minnesota,
where it also established its principal place of business. Its aircraft
were registered in Minnesota and were continuously engaged in inter-
state commerce. Minnesota levied an ad valorem property tax upon
Northwest's entire fleet of aircraft, although under apportionment
methods of assessment, only fourteen percent of Northwest's total
scheduled route mileage and sixteen percent of its total scheduled
plane mileage was actually within Minnesota. In upholding the con-
stitutional validity of the tax, the Court noted that the unique relation-
ship between Northwest and Minnesota and "the benefits which this
relation affords are the constitutional foundation for the taxing power
which Minnesota has asserted." "'
A key factor in the Court's decision to allow the domiciliary state
to tax the entire fleet was the belief that no tax situs had been estab-
lished in any nondomiciliary state.3 2 In order for the aircraft to have
acquired a nondomiciliary tax situs, it would have had to acquire a
permanent location elsewhere continuously throughout the year.3
30. 322 U.s. 292 (1974) (5-4 decision).
31. Id. at 294. Rather than apportion the tax to more accurately reflect the
degree to which the aircraft partook of Minnesota's afforded benefits, the Court
stopped its analysis after finding the existence of some nexus. The fact that
the Court had gone beyond these mere preliminaries in Pullman leads one
to conjecture that the Court's actual reasons for upholding the tax lie elsewhere.
32. "Not to subject property that has no locality other than the State of its
owner's domicile to taxation there would free such floating property from taxation
everywhere .... [N]either the Commerce Clause nor the Fourteenth Amendment
affords such constitutional immunity." Id. at 300. For recent discussions of the
Court's struggle to harmonize taxation of interstate commerce and constitutional
mandates, see generally 7 CAP. U.L. REV. 143 (1977); 127 U. PA. L. REv. 817
(1979).
33. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. at 298. The Court in
essence reaffirmed its strict standards for due process considerations, i.e., whether
a "substantial nexus" exists. The standards enunciated and applied by the Court
are the threads of consistency which may govern one's actions or judge the
probable actions of others. But the taxing sword is two-edged. A domiciliary
state is presumed to be able to tax all of the property, which need not be con-
tinuously and permanently within the domiciliary state. In order for any non-
domiciliary state to acquire the jurisdiction necessary to tax such property, the
property must be continuously and permanently present within it. The tax
must then be fairly apportioned to the benefits afforded the property. In this
manner, the domiciliary state's taxing power is derived from its status as such,
rather than from the property's presence within its boundaries.
NOTE
The Northwest Airlines Court did not apply the apportionment rule,
and stated that such a method of assessment was inappropriate for
property found within a state for only fractional periods of time. 4 It
is worth noting that the Court, while finding the power to tax aircraft
belonging only to the domiciliary state, did not even mention the home
port doctrine. Justice Jackson, however, in his concurring opinion,
still found it to be a viable doctrine."m
The majority opinion appears to be based upon poor reasoning,
although for arguably valid motives. The apportionment rule was
designed to enable states to levy proportioned taxes upon property
which was not permanently within the taxing state. The Court, how-
ever, then established a requirement that the property have a "per-
manent" location within a nondomiciliary state before such state
could levy a tax upon it. The majority's finding that the aircraft had
not acquired any nondomiciliary tax situses thus contravened the
spirit, if not the letter, of the apportionment rule. The fact that non-
domiciliary states had not levied any property taxes upon the aircraft
seems to have weighed heavily with the Court. It apparently feared
that the aircraft might escape taxation on their full value if the domi-
ciliary state was not permitted to levy such a tax. In deciding
whether a domiciliary state has the constitutional ability to levy this
tax, the Court focused on whether or not nondomiciliary states had
exercised their taxing power.3 6 The result of this case was that the
34. The fact that the apportionment rule was first applied to land commerce
does not seem to be a convincing rationale for keeping it so restricted. Logi-
cally, there would appear to be no real difficulty in extending this tax rule to other
forms of commerce. One gets the distinct impression that the Court was really
concerned with the fact that no nondomiciliary tax situses had been affirmatively
shown to exist. If this were the case, the aircraft might indeed "escape" taxa-
tion. But this would be attributable to nondomiciliary states' decision not to
exercise their constitutional rights of taxation. Rather than risk this, the Court
simply finds the apportionment rule to be inapplicable here.
35. Justice Jackson's concurring opinion alludes to the possibility that states
may seek to tax the aircraft for merely passing through their airspace, and that
this lack of physical contact with a state removes this case from others in which
apportionment was applied. He felt the landing and taking-off of aircraft to be
similar to a ship's port of call. But the crux of his opinion, and its strict adher-
ence to the home port doctrine, is that the apportionment rule cannot actually
prevent duplicative state taxation. The fear of duplicative state taxation is not
wholly unfounded. There exist numerous apportionment formula from which
the states may choose. If every state chooses the most advantageous formula
for itself, it is possible that property could end up being taxed beyond its full
value.
36. Perhaps the Court was unwilling, for other important reasons, to find
that nondomiciliary tax situses had been established, absent an affirmative show-
ing of such by the plaintiffs. If other tax situses were presumed to have been
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apportionment rule was restricted to land-based commerce, which is
less transitory in nature than other forms of commerce.1
7
Extension of the Rule to Nonland-based
Instrumentalities of Commerce
Fifty-eight years after the Hays decision, the Supreme Court
finally reexamined the strong distinction it had drawn between ocean-
going and land-based instrumentalities. In Ott v. Mississippi Barge
Line,88 the Court upheld the constitutional validity of an apportioned
ad valorem property tax which the City of New Orleans and the
created, as is most likely the reality, then other questions, which the Court was
not yet prepared to confront, may have arisen: 1) Is the length of time spent
within a nondomiciliary state the only factor in determining tax situs? If so, then
what of aircraft, receiving the benefit of a state's facilities and services, which
merely land, refuel, and leave again? 2) What length of time would engender a
substantial nexus, i.e., tax situs, so as to permit nondomiciliary state taxation of
property? 3) What if one state's determination of a "substantial nexus" differed
significantly from another state's practice, resulting in the attraction of a greater
amount of interstate and foreign commerce? Should this practice be allowed to
free property from taxation altogether? Although the Court could have reached
its decision without deciding these questions, it is suggested that any other deci-
sion would have invited further litigation on these issues.
37. In a strong dissent, Mr. Chief Justice Stone found Minnesota's tax uncon-
stitutional because, if other states could levy a tax upon the aircraft, a prohibited
burden on interstate commerce would result; the property would be taxed on its
full value by Minnesota as well as being subject to nondomiciliary state taxation.
The dissent argued that nondomiciliary state taxes would only be constitutionally
permissible if fairly apportioned to the property's presence in the state:
To refuse now to apply the rule of apportionment to petitioner's air-
planes, after a half century of its application by this Court as the means
of avoiding prohibited multiple state tax burdens on vehicles of inter-
state transportation . . . [slubjects a new and important industry to
state tax burdens, essentially discriminatory in their effect on interstate
commerce . . . [w]hich it was the very purpose of the commerce clause
to avoid.
Such "essential discrimination" upon interstate commerce could occur because
the majority opinion recognized the nondomiciliary state's constitutional right to
tax property which enjoyed the state's benefits and protection, while also up-
holding the domiciliary state's constitutional right to levy a full ad valorem prop-
erty tax upon the same property. The dissent also considered the Minnesota
tax so disproportionate to the protection and benefits afforded the instrumentali-
ties by it, that it constituted an intolerable burden on interstate commerce. The
tax could be set aside only if palpably excessive, but such action could be
avoided by the use of apportionment principles "which it (was) the constitutional
duty of the State of Minnesota to apply." Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota,
322 U.S. at 325. Further, the extent to which a state might tax interstate com-
merce was based upon the constitutionality of its actions, and not upon whether or
not other states levied taxes.
38. 336 U.S. 169 (1949).
NOTE
nondomiciliary State of Louisiana had levied upon certain vessels en-
gaged in interstate commerce. These vessels operated according to no
fixed schedule, and remained within Louisiana only long enough to un-
load, load, and make any necessary repairs. The vessels traveled upon
inland waters only and did not traverse international waterways.
While noting that the "element of apportionment" had not been
considered in previous decisions concerning vessels employed upon
the high seas or inland waters, the Court declined to extend its judg-
ment to ocean carriage.3 9 At the same time, the Court stated: "We
can see no reason which should put water transportation on a different
constitutional footing than other interstate enterprises. "40 The
Court's sudden reversal in extending the apportionment rule to vessels
was not further explained. The Court simply stated:
We see no practical difference so far as either the Due Process
Clause or the Commerce Clause is concerned whether it is vessels
or railroad cars that are moving in interstate commerce. The
problem under the Commerce Clause is to determine "what por-
tion of an interstate organism may appropriately be attributed to
each of the various states in which it functions." 41
In short, the problem was reduced to that of proper apportionment,
intertwined with the due process question. The due process test re-
lated to the commerce clause test because if the tax is proportionate
to the commerce carried on within a state, then due process require-
ments are also satisfied.
42
Concerning the unanswered question of apportionment, the tax-
payers argued that their vessels were not continuously within Louisi-
ana, but were present for only fractional periods of the tax year, and
were, therefore, not proper subjects for taxation. Regarding this con-
tention, the Court implied that a fixed proportion of the taxed property
had to be present within the state for the whole taxable year before
the state could tax such property.
Having decided that a nondomiciliary state could levy an appor-
tioned ad valorem property tax on instrumentalities of commerce
which were "permanently" within its jurisdiction, the Ott Court left
unanswered the question whether a domiciliary state could levy an
39. Only Justice Jackson dissented in this case.
40. Id. at 175.
41. Id. at 174, citing Nashville, C. & St. L.R. Co. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362,
365 (1939).
42. See note 18 supra.
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unapportioned ad valorem property tax upon the same instrumentali-
ties. 3 This question was soon presented in Standard Oil v. Peck by
an Ohio corporate taxpayer whose vessels transported oil interstate via
vessels traveling solely upon inland waters.44 The vessels were regis-
tered in Ohio, but stopped there only occasionally for fuel or repairs.
Ohio levied an unapportioned ad valorem property tax upon all of the
taxpayer's vessels. The Court found that most of the vessels were
continuously outside of Ohio, and therefore, the tax could be appor-
tioned between several states: "The rule which permits taxation by
two or more states on an apportionment basis precludes taxation of
all of the property by the State of the domicile." " If this were not so,
multiple taxation of interstate operations would otherwise occur, and
the tax would not be related to the opportunities, benefits, or protec-
tion conferred or afforded by the taxing state to those operations.
The majority opinion in Standard Oil indicated an important shift
in the Court's philosophy.4" Whereas the Court had previously been
strongly influenced by the possibility that property not affirmatively
shown to have acquired nondomiciliary tax situses might escape full
taxation if the domiciliary state was not allowed to fully tax the prop-
erty, the Court in Standard Oil recognized that the constitutional
ability of nondomiciliary states to levy a tax was sufficient, in and of
itself, to require the invocation of the apportionment rule. The con-
stitutional ability of a domiciliary state to tax property would no
longer depend upon whether nondomiciliary states exercised their
constitutional right to tax or not. Thus, sound constitutional reasoning
overcame the fear that some property might escape taxation alto-
gether.
At this point, however, such reasoning prevailed only as to land-
based instrumentalities of commerce and vessels traveling upon inland
waters. In Braniff Airways v. Nebraska State Board of Equalization,
47
43. Although one might assume that the domiciliary state could not do this,
the strong protection formerly given to domiciliary states by the Court left this
question open. If it could not be shown that nondomiciliary states could levy a
tax, then the domiciliary state has a better chance of constitutionally levying an
unapportioned tax.
44. 342 U.S. 382 (1952).
45. Id. at 384.
46. Justice Minton's dissent accurately reflects this sudden shift by the Court.
The sudden abandonment of the necessity of showing a nondomiciliary tax situs
having been established before the domiciliary state can be deprived of its right
to fully tax property is decried as being an uncalled-for departure from prece-
dent. The dissent seems to have a valid point. Id. at 387.
47. 347 U.S. 590 (1954).
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the nondomiciliary State of Nebraska levied an apportioned ad val-
orem property tax upon aircraft engaged in interstate commerce
which had fixed routes and regularly landed within Nebraska. The
stops in Nebraska occurred only long enough for unloading and re-
loading. Braniff maintained no facilities in Nebraska.
Braniff relied on cases involving ocean-going vessels in alleging
that its aircraft had not acquired a tax situs in Nebraska. The Court
rejected the airline's argument finding that "a closer analogy exists
between planes flying interstate and boats that ply the inland waters.
We perceive no logical basis for distinguishing the constitutional
power to impose a tax on such aircraft from power to impose taxes on
river boats." 48  The Court found that a tax situs was created in
Nebraska by the "'habitual employment of the property within the
State.' "" As a result, the Court vastly reduced the requisite amount
of contacts between property and a nondomiciliary state that were
necessary before that state could tax. The requirement of a "perma-
nent location" was reduced 'to a standard of mere "habitual employ-
ment." The Braniff Court interpreted Northwest Airlines, whose facts
were almost identical, as having already sanctioned the apportionment
rule as to aircraft but not having applied it because there was no
showing that any portion of the property involved had acquired a tax
situs elsewhere. In essence, the majority in Braniff pronounced
Northwest Airlines dead, and relegated the issue to that of a mere
burden of proof, i.e., simply demonstrating that the aircraft were
habitually within the nondomiciliary state.50 Rather than overrule
Northwest Airlines outright, the Court revived the "habitual employ-
ment" standard as the standard by which the creation of a tax situs
was to be judged.5' The Court's reasoning indicates that nondomi-
ciliary state taxation of instrumentalities of interstate commerce is
48. Id. at 600.
49. Id. at 601 citing Johnson Oil Refining Co. v. State of Oklahoma, 290 U.S.
158, 162 (1933).
50. In Northwest Airlines, a domiciliary state tax levied upon an entire fleet
of aircraft was upheld because no other tax situses had been affirmatively shown.
The distinction drawn is one of form rather than of substance, however. In
Northwest Airlines, the aircraft were recognized to have flown regular, fixed
routes and yet were said to have not established nondomiciliary tax situses.
Indeed, they had not, under the totally different standard being applied by the
Court. This major difference is overlooked by the Court in Braniff.
51. Standard Oil was said to have interpreted Northwest Airlines to mean
that nondomiciliary states tax instrumentalities of "interstate commerce on the
apportionment basis in accordance with their use in the (nondomiciliary) state."
347 U.S. at 602. It appears that Justice Minton's dissent in Standard Oil is
more accurate as to what Standard Oil really meant, i.e., a departure from previous
tax situs tests and the concomitant invocation of the apportionment rule.
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sanctioned as long as it is in proportion -to the time in which the
instrumentality is found within the nondomiciliary state, regardless of
whether or not the instrumentality was "permanently located" there.
Standard Oil simply states that "it was not shown that 'a defined
part of the domiciliary corpus' has acquired a taxable situs else-
where."52  A tax situs created in accord with the Northwest Airlines
decision was therefore a far cry from that extrapolated by the Court
in Braniff-" After Standard Oil, a domiciliary state was required to
apply the apportionment rule to property which had obviously ac-
quired a tax situs elsewhere, despite the fact that no affirmative show-
ing of the existence of another tax situs was made. 4 The fact that
the property was not permanently and continuously within the domi-
ciliary state prevented the state from fully taxing the property.
Whether a domiciliary state need apply the apportionment rule to
property which was not continuously within the state and which was
unlikely to have acquired a viable nondomiciliary tax situs was left
undecided.
C. The California Decisions:
Apportionment Rule v. Home Port Doctrine
The Supreme Court of California, in Flying Tiger Line v. County
of Los Angeles,55 held that the domiciliary state must still use an
apportioned tax related to the time during which the property was
physically present within the state's jurisdiction.5" In Flying Tiger
52. 342 U.S. at 384. Here, the Court found a nondorniciliary tax situs to
have been shown. The crucial point though is the test to be applied in making
this finding. When the Court shifts its footing in this manner it can only be
detrimental to judicial integrity. The refusal to recognize such a shift is what
reflects poorly upon judicial logic and consistency. The mere absence from the
domiciliary state was said to prove the existence of nondomiciliary tax situses.
53. In the Johnson Oil Refining Co. case, . . this Court reaffirmed not
less than three times that the State of domicile has jurisdiction to tax the
personal property of its corporation unless such property has acquired
an "actual situs" in another State. And by "actual situs" it meant ...
continuous presence in another State . . .personalty that has become
a permanent part of the foreign State. Surely the situs . . .cannot be
made to depend on some undefined concept of "permanence" short of
a tax year ....
322 U.S. at 296 n.2.
54. 342 U.S. 382 (1952).
55. 51 Cal. 2d 314, 333 P.2d 323 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1001
(1959) (hereinafter Flying Tiger).
56. The underlying principle is that of the apportionment rule, e.g., that
property should only be subject to state taxation to the extent to which it
NOTE
Line, a Delaware corporation, with its principal place of business in
Los Angeles, owned aircraft which were used primarily overseas and
yet were assessed by the County of Los Angeles at 100% of their value.
The California Supreme Court struck down the assessment as uncon-
stitutional under the Due Process Clause, relying upon Standard Oil.
In so doing, the Court stated:
A taxpayer resisting an ad valorem tax on personal property
based on an unapportioned assessment does not have the burden
of showing that other States have actually imposed a tax on such
property. He is entitled to an assessment on an apportionment
basis if the record shows that he was, during a tax year, receiving
substantial benefits and protection in more than one state .... 57
The Court reasoned that the fact that a large portion of the property
might escape taxation altogether could not alter a state's constitu-
tional power to tax. The conduct of other states was irrelevant to the
question of constitutionality.
actually is benefited by the state. This may have little relation to the actual
benefits received. For example, during 1957-58 in the County of Los Angeles,
fifty-five percent of the total revenue obtained from general property taxes was
allocated to school funds, and as such, conferred no direct benefits upon com-
mercial transportation. Only thirty-five percent of the receipts were allocated
to general county funds, and more than two-thirds of that amount was devoted
to such expenditures as charities, hospitals, and corrections. Thus, while it is
difficult to estimate the amount that is spent upon benefits and protection for
which the county could legitimately claim compensation from transient carriers,
it would seem that such expenditures are probably less than the taxes collected
from such carriers. See 11 STAN. L. REV. 518, 535 (1959).
The counter-argument is that the carrier benefits indirectly from all expend-
itures made by the state: paved roads, police and fire protection, etc. Without
these indirect benefits, the carrier might very well have to forego doing any
business altogether. The process of apportionment bears directly upon com-
merce clause considerations as evidenced by Complete Auto Transit. However,
in the past, it has been said:
Although a tax sometimes purports to be a quid pro quo-as, for ex-
ample, a highway-use tax-so that the cost to the state might be
ascertainable, this is not true of most taxes; they can be regarded only
as exactions by the State for the general benefits of living under an
organized government. Since it is impossible to allocate the benefits
and thus their costs, to individual taxpayers, the congruence or lack
thereof between a particular tax affecting (foreign) commerce and the
benefit conferred on the person taxed can furnish no useful test of
constitutionality.
75 HA.v. L. REV. 953, 957 (1962). This position is no longer tenable.
57. See Flying Tiger, 333 P.2d at 323. The Court went on to say: "It is
obvious that to permit Los Angeles County to tax the full value of the property
here involved, would impose a tax beyond that justified by its physical contacts
with the county, a tax that the county has no power to impose, and thus, violate
due process." Id. at 330 (Carter, J., concurring).
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In Scandinavian Airlines Sys. v. County of Los Angeles,a8 a case
of first impression, a taxpayer's airplanes were foreign-owned, foreign-
based and registered, and used exclusively in foreign commerce.
Each plane averaged eight round-trip flights per year and remained
at the Los Angeles Airport for less than thirty-four hours per stop.
The aircraft were taxed at their full value at their "home port." 59
However, the County of Los Angeles levied an apportioned tax upon
them as well.
Analogizing between aircraft flying the international skyways and
vessels plying the international waterways, the California Supreme
Court held the home port doctrine applicable. Because United States
courts could not exercise control over foreign taxing authorities, the
apportionment rule was unworkable, and the problem thereby became
one of federal jurisdiction. Insofar as the aircraft did not differ from
other instrumentalities of commerce with foreign nations, the home
port rule was held to be on point. "[Because] State taxation of the
planes of foreign air carriers involves international political and eco-
nomic problems . . . ," " 'the area was held to be one of an exclu-
sively federal nature. The states therefore had to abstain from this
field because:
A state cannot deal directly with a foreign nation, by treaty or
otherwise. This it must leave to federal government. If its at-
tempted actions in a given field would result in discriminatory
practices as between two foreign nations, then it must eschew
that field in its entirety. [Tlaxation of foreign owned and based
instruments of commerce represents a field that is peculiarly
58. 56 Cal. 2d 11, 363 P.2d 25, 14 Cal. Rptr. 25 (1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 899 (1961).
59. This appears to have been a significant factor in aiding the Court's
decision in Japan Line:
We are informed by the Department of State that after inquiry of its
posts abroad, it determined that only one nation, Afghanistan, imposes
property taxes on foreign containers or other instruments of foreign
commerce entering its jurisdiction. All other nations have adhered to
the international custom of allowing containers, as well as vessels and
other instruments of foreign commerce, to be introduced for the ex-
clusive purpose of conducting such commerce free of all customs duties
and general taxes, including property taxes.
Brief for the United States as amicus curiae, at 15. This does not mean that
the State goes uncompensated for services rendered: "'Fees' that are related
to the value of specific services provided to vessels and containers, as opposed
to general taxes to support the operation of government . . . are, however,
permissibly charged under the custom of nations." Id. at 15 n.7.
60. 363 P.2d at 38.
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federal in nature, without regard to such specific constitutional
considerations as the commerce clause or the due process clause,
and which must be left to the administration of the federal govern-
ment, even in the absence of any present federal legislation
thereon.61
Justice Traynor and Chief Justice Gibson joined in a vigorous dissent.
Both Justices believed that the state has a broader constitutional
power to tax than the majority was willing to recognize. "2
I. THE lapan Line OPMION
The Supreme Court of California denied six Japanese shipping
firms any refund of the $553,200 in taxes which had been levied by
the City and County of Los Angeles upon their shipping containers.
The firms were incorporated under Japanese law, and their commer-
cial domiciles and principal places of business were located in Japan.
The containers were registered in Japan, bad an average stay in Cali-
fornia of less than three weeks, were used exclusively in foreign com-
61. Id. at 43.
62. The dissent argued that since aircraft flying from California in foreign
commerce could be taxed by California only on an apportioned basis if the
aircraft had acquired a taxable situs elsewhere, then the converse should also
hold true, i.e., aircraft engaged in foreign commerce flying into California should
also be taxed upon an apportioned basis. If the home port doctrine was in-
applicable in the first instance, it should be inapplicable in the second as well.
A tax situs having been created in California, an apportioned state tax was
therefore constitutionally permissible. In addition, the Due Process Clause was
no barrier because the foreign aircraft partook of the "opportunities, benefits
or protection" provided by the state to the same extent as aircraft flying in
interstate commerce.
Concerning possible discrimination against foreign commerce, the dissent
stated: "Obviously there is no discrimination if a state taxes migratory property
used in such commerce in the same way it taxes migratory property used in
interstate commerce. Moreover, it precludes discrimination against interstate
commerce." 363 P.2d at 45. (Traynor, J., dissenting). The dissent believed that
any risk of multiple taxation could only arise from foreign nations levying ad
valorem taxes upon the instrumentalities' full value, and such a situation could
not detract from the states' power to levy apportioned taxes. Therefore, it was
the foreign nations' actions that were burdening and discriminating against
foreign commerce and not the state tax. State taxation was thus consonant
with Commerce Clause requirements. If relief from such burdensome taxation
was to be granted, however, it could not emanate from the courts via one's
constitutional rights. Instead, action would have to be taken by Congress
through either: 1) a prohibition against state taxation of foreign instrumentalities
of commerce; or 2) treaties which would reciprocally preclude such discrimina-
tion from being placed upon foreign commerce. In conclusion, the dissent
stated that the home port doctrine should rationally be applied either to all
aircraft employed in foreign commerce, or to none.
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merce, and were fully taxed by the Japanese government. The United
States Supreme Court (in an 8-1 decision ),1 3 in reversing the Supreme
Court of California, rejected California's contention that a state 'has the
constitutional power to tax all commerce and its instrumentalities
which are found within its jurisdiction on the "lien date." The Su-
preme Court of California had relied upon a recent California case,
Sea-Land Service Inc. v. County of Alameda, 4 which found the home
port doctrine "anachronistic" and which upheld an apportioned prop-
erty tax levied upon domestically-owned containers used in both
intercoastal and foreign commerce." The United States Supreme
Court, however, drew a vital distinction between foreign and inter-
state commerce, and concluded that when foreign commerce is in-
volved, special considerations must be recognized. The involvement
of foreign-owned instrumentalities of commerce differentiates this
situation from those already considered by the Court, and requires a
different rationale and result.
When the Supreme Court followed its previous trend and re-
versed the California Supreme Court, it implied that Scandinavian
Airlines Sys. v. County of Los Angeles 6 was correct in its result, al-
though mistaken in its rationale. By refusing to follow the Scandina-
vian Airlines rationale, the Court further implied that Sea-Land was
correct in rejecting the home port doctrine as being outmoded. "7 The
U.S. Supreme Court's refusal to adopt the home port doctrine as its
decisional basis implies a rejection of the "foreign-owned" versus
"domestically-owned" distinction upon which state taxing power has
hinged.18  The California decision in Flying Tiger Line,69 i.e., that a
domiciliary state may apportionately tax instrumentalities engaged
in foreign commerce, when contrasted with Scandinavian Airlines,
seems to advocate such a distinction. In Scandinavian Airlines, a
63. Rehnquist, J., dissenting.
64. 12 Cal. 3d 772, 528 P.2d 56, 117 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1974) (hereinafter
Sea-Land).
65. The California Supreme Court in Japan Line believed that this decision
had overruled Scandinavian Airlines.
66. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
67. "Given its origins, the doctrine could be said to be 'anachronistic', given
its underpinnings, it may indeed be said to have been 'abandoned'." Northwest
Airlines, cited in Japan Line, 99 S. Ct. at 1818-19.
68. Further support for the belief that the home port rule is conducive to
this type of distinction is found in the amicus curiae brief. See Brief for the
United States as arnicus curiae at 8, 10.
69. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
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nondomiciliary state's apportioned tax on foreign-owned instrumen-
talities of commerce was struck down, and the instrumentalities' own-
ership was a major factor in the decision.
The U.S. Supreme Court's refusal to draw this type of distinction
avoids possible future problems when foreign-owned instrumentalities
might be partly engaged in interstate commerce. Would they be ex-
empt from state taxation due to their foreign domicile or would
they be subject to the same taxation as U.S. interstate transporta-
tion? Case law holding that "interstate commerce must bear its fair
share of the state tax burden" 70 would seem to demand proper state
taxation:
If the state tax 'is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus
with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate
against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the services
provided by the state,' no impermissible burden on interstate
commerce will be found.71
Although this statement was made regarding interstate commerce, it
would seem to be equally true for foreign commerce as well. No-
where in the formula does a domiciliary factor come into play. Yet,
in a footnote, the U.S. Supreme Court reserves judgment on this ques-
tion for a later time.7 ' The distinction drawn between foreign and
interstate commerce avoids such possible problems. However, it also
ignores the fact that domestic versus foreign ownership is an impor-
tant factor to be considered. It is clear that instrumentalities of for-
eign commerce which are domestically-owned are subject to proper
state taxation regardless of whether another nation is taxing the in-
strumentality to such a degree that the multiple taxation exceeds the
instrumentalities' full value. The domiciliary state will still have the
constitutional right to levy a proportioned tax upon the property.
When foreign ownership of commercial instrumentalities is involved,
however, the issues are thus elevated from a domestic sphere, where
the taxpayer is represented within one political system, to the interna-
tional sphere, where conflicting interests cannot be voiced on a na-
tional level alone.
70. See note 37 supra.
71. 430 U.S. at 279.
72. See 99 S. Ct. 1819 n.7. But see id. at 1820. (That Complete Auto
would apply and be satisfied if purely interstate commerce, lends support to
taxation of partly interstate commerce. This is especially so in view of Western
Livestock).
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The Supreme Court's opinion, however, does not draw clear
distinctions between the interplay of foreign commerce and interna-
tional relations. It would seem that international relations will be-
come relevant only when foreign owners of commercial instrumen-
talities are involved. The Court is unclear in its definition of "foreign
commerce," but appears to be thinking solely in terms of foreign-owned
instrumentalities which are entering the United States" If Flying
Tiger Line is consistent with constitutional precepts, then, clearly,
domestically-owned instrumentalities of foreign commerce are prop-
erly subject to apportioned state taxes. Therefore, when the Court
speaks in broad terms of foreign commerce, it is actually addressing
itself to foreign commerce in which the instrumentalities are domi-
ciled abroad. This view, however, has overtones of the home port
doctrine, which the Court carefully avoids.
A. New Constitutional Tests
The Japan Line decision is important because it adds two con-
stitutional tests which must be applied in determining whether foreign
commerce is susceptible to apportioned state taxation. In addition
to the constitutional tests of nexus, nondiscrimination, and appor-
tionment,7 4 one must ask: first, whether the tax creates "a substan-
tial risk of international multiple taxation; and second, whether the
tax prevents the federal government from 'speaking with one voice
when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments. If
a state tax contravenes either of these precepts, it is unconstitutional
under the Commerce Clause." 7  In the instant case, the containers
were fully taxed by Japan, and international multiple taxation was
an actuality, not just a mere risk.
The second basis for the Court's decision in Japan Line was that
the California tax prevents the United States from "speaking with one
voice" in regulating foreign trade." State taxation would interfere
with the Commerce Clause's grant of power to the federal govern-
ment. International disputes might arise over apportionment for-
mulas, retaliatory taxation would be likely to occur,77 and consequently,
73. Id. at 1819 n.7.
74. See note 8 supra.
75. 99 S. Ct. at 1823.
76. See Board of Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48 (1933) cited in
Japan Line, 99 S. Ct. at 1823.
77. This is far from mere speculation:
We are informed by the Department of State that six foreign govern-
ments, including some of our most important trading partners, have
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the nation's international relations would be disrupted. 8 If California
were allowed to levy this property tax, it would, in effect, be indirectly
influencing and forming our national foreign relations. It would
amount to a regulation of foreign commerce contra to the Commerce
Clause. This is necessarily so because even a de minimus duplication
of taxation assumes unbearable proportions in the field of foreign
commerce. Lastly, although the prohibition against state taxation of
foreign-owned instrumentalities of foreign commerce may deprive
states of earned revenue, the proper forum to litigate such questions
is in the legislature.70  The Court thus seems to feel that these ques-
tions are of such a political nature so as to be nonjusticiable. How-
ever, some possible justiciable questions were left unanswered: (1)
whether such a state tax constitutes an "import or duty" in contraven-
tion of the Constitution;8" (2) the states' ability to tax foreign-owned
instrumentalities of foreign commerce which are involved in interstate
commerce as well;81 and (3) when a risk of international multiple
taxation is to be deemed to be "substantial" and what criteria are to
be used.8" The Court found it unnecessary to discuss due process
requirements. The refusal to use a due process rationale may be
explained by a sound judicial hesitancy to answer questions which
are not absolutely necessary to the Court's decision and which may
not be presently ripe so as to be passed upon.
written the Department expressing concern about the effect on foreign
commerce of the California container tax .... .In addition, twelve
countries have sent diplomatic notes concerning the stated intention of
the State of California ....
Brief for the United States as amicus curiae at 20-21. At the time of the
Scandinavian Airlines case, it was proven that retaliatory action was sure to
follow from at least one major nation should the airline's aircraft have been
held taxable by California:
In fact, the Japanese taxation authorities are now studying the as-
sessment of property tax on foreign aircraft, strictly based on the mutual
equity principle, and, it will be effective when all of our efforts to reach
a reasonable solution on the U.S. property tax are proved to be of no
avail.
11 STAN. L. REv. 518, 520 n.12 (1959). See 99 S. Ct. at 1824 n.18 (1979).
78. The Customs Convention on Containers is an example of the "desir-
ability of uniform treatment of containers used exclusively in foreign com-
merce .... ." It also reflects a national policy of promoting the use of containers
in international trade. Any state action which would tend to decrease their
use would be contra to this national policy. Brief for the United States as
amicus curiae at 19 a.
79. 99 S. Ct. at 1826.
80. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, cl. 2 provides: "No state shall . .. lay any
Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports .... " See id. at 1817 n.4.
81. 99 S. Ct. at 1819 n.7.
82. Id. at 1823 n.17.
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B. Japan Line in Perspective
Japan Line's divergence from the due process rationale, however,
appears inconsistent with prior case law. Throughout the earlier cases,
there flows a persistent concern with due process and commerce clause
considerations, albeit called by various names and examined under
differing standards. In Hays v. Pacific Mail, S.S., the lack of any
notion of tax apportionment was the determinative factor in disallow-
ing the nondomiciliary state's tax. Allowing the tax on the basis that
the vessels had merely entered the local port would have violated the
nexus and other due process requirements, since such contacts were
insufficient to give rise to a tax situs. 8
The advent of the apportionment rule obviated the need for the
home port doctrine as enunciated in Hays. Rather, the Supreme
Court, in Northwest Airlines, shifted its analysis to a stringent "perma-
nency" standard when applying due process tests. 4 Due process was
considered satisfied only when the property sought to be taxed had a
year-long contact with the taxing state. However, the growing ac-
ceptance and trust in the apportionment rule's constitutional viability,
and the legitimate desire of a state to tax those objects upon which
benefits had been conferred, led to a relaxation of the permanency
standard to that of mere "habitual employment." 85 This shift reflected
the realization that a large segment of migratory property, having
substantial contacts with a state, might otherwise escape taxation
merely because its contacts were only for brief periods of time. To
not require such property to pay for the benefits and opportunities
afforded to it by the nondomiciliary state appears manifestly unjust.
The apportionment rile, at least in theory, permits "fractional" taxa-
tion, no matter how small.
83. The Court's comment that admiralty law applied to a vessel outside
of its home port may very well have been another indication that the contacts
between the instrumentality and the state were so attenuated that the vessel
could not be said to have received any benefits or protection from the non-
domiciliary state. In this respect, the nexus test is intertwined with the due
process test.
84. See Northwest Airlines, supra note 30.
85. See generally Johnson Oil Refining Co. v. State of Oklahoma, 240 U.S.
158 (1933); Pullman's Palace-Car Co. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 141
U.S. 18 (1891); Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169
(1949). See also Braniff Airways v. Nebraska State Bd. of Eq., 347 U.S. at
601 n.19. This "habitual employment" standard had been used years earlier
in Johnson Oil. Since that time, it had been all but forgotten, as exemplified
by the 1974 decision in Northwest Airlines which applied a "permanent and
continuous" standard. Pullman's Palace-Car had also applied a "continuous"
standard, as did Ott. The Court failed to mention this oversight.
NOTE
In this increasingly liberal atmosphere favoring nondomiciliary
state taxation of the instrumentalities of commerce, Japan Line con-
fronted the Supreme Court with the problem initially posed by Hays:
the inability to apportion taxes. Could this inability detract from a
state's constitutional power to levy taxes? United States courts, un-
able to dictate to foreign nations the extent to which they may tax
foreign-owned and registered property, cannot assure that such prop-
erty will not be taxed beyond its full value as a consequence of a
foreign imposed tax. It is this question of whether a state's constitu-
tional powers can be altered by the actions of foreign nations which
led to Japan Line's two newly established constitutional criteria. Japan
Line is an attempt to apply constitutional principles of state taxation,
as developed in earlier case law, to international activities.
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